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1. Abstract 
This paper considers whether the existence and operation of the Maori electoral 
districts is consistent with a general theory of democracy and with the New Zealand 
experience of democracy. The paper explores the history of the Maori seats and 
investigates their place in a democratic society. The paper then considers the tension 
between the powerful, and culturally embedded concept New Zealanders appear to 
prize of 'one person, one vote ' and democratic theory about identity representation. 
This paper concludes that the existence of the Maori seats is consistent with 
democratic theory and practice. 
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2. Introduction 
New Zealand is one of the few democratic nations in the world that incorporates, in its 
electoral system, special provisions for its indigenous people. New Zealand has seven 
electoral districts that ensure Maori representation in the national assembly, 
parliament. The Maori electoral districts, also known as the Maori seats, are both 
geographically and ethnically based electorates. 
The Maori seats are controversial. Critics assert that the Maori seats are exclusionary 
and antithetical to the practices of a liberal state. The strongest and most serious 
criticism of the seats is that they are undemocratic. In a country that prides itself on its 
egalitarian character, and being one of the oldest democracies in the world, such an 
allegation challenges New Zealand' s political foundations. 
This paper examines whether this is an accurate criticism by considering the role of 
the Maori seats in broad democratic theory. 
The paper first reviews a number of definitions of democracy, as broadly constructed. 
From those broad definitions a framework is developed that defines the key elements 
of democracy and which functions as a measure of the democratic nature of forms and 
practices of government. 
The paper then examines the history and development of New Zealand' s Maori seats 
in order to understand the cultural and historical contexts of their formation and 
operation. The paper reviews the development of democracy in New Zealand and the 
criticisms of the Maori seats in that democracy. Having established what democracy 
means, what the Maori seats are, and how democracy operates in New Zealand, the 
paper exammes whether the seats are undemocratic by testing them against the 
framework. 
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The notion of the 'one person, one vote' rule and its tension with identity 
representation is then examined. The 'one person, one vote' rule and identity 
representation are described and the different arguments around their definitions 
canvassed and assessed. The Maori seats are contested against the concept and 
practices of the 'one person, one vote ' rules and then finally, the democratic 
legitimacy of identity representation is examined/ 
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3. Democracy 
While practices of democracy had their ongms m classical Greece and Rome, 
democracy as we believe in it, developed as a popular political theory m the 
eighteenth century. In the following century, democracy became the norm for 
governance. 1 The notion of democracy, and what it represents, has acquired a utopian 
dimension and has been reified as the one true form of governance. In the last half of 
the nineteenth century democratic theory was claimed to be the only moral system of 
governing possible. The calls for democracy, as practised in that time, came from the 
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution who asserted that capitalism and democracy 
were two sides of the same coin. In some western democratic countries, criticism of 
democratic theory was and is still, viewed as being contrary to the national interest 
and unpatriotic. The uncritical championing of democracy means it has taken on a 
sanctity and fundamentalism that alternatives, such as anarchism or guardianship, are 
viewed as attacks on human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Commentators have offered many different definitions of democracy and proposed a 
variety of tests for determining the democracy of institutions. Reviewing the 
definitions of many commentators suggests that finding a definition of democracy is 
relatively simple, but that it is the application of democracy into practices and 
institutions that profound difficulties and inconsistencies arise. 
This paper constructs a three level framework that defines the key constituent 
elements of democracy. Level One sets out fundamental rules; Level Two sets out 
democratic principles; and Level Three sets out mechanisms necessary for 
implementing the fundamental rules and the principles. 
1 Robert Dahl Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989) pp. 13-33 
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Level One establishes that democracy is a political theory. It is a concept, a 
philosophy. The first level contains the fundamental rules of democracy. Level One 
does not explain how democracy is implemented or carried out. That is where 
democratic principles and mechanisms assist. The constituent elements of democracy 
can be broken done to a set of democratic principles. Level Two sets out the 
principles utilised to implement the fundamental rules of democracy,2 the elements of 
procedural democracy which are the underlying characteristics of democracy. Level 
Three sets out the democratic mechanisms, the tools used to ensure fair and 
representative processes and describes the actual practices that are used. 
The framework provides a measure of democracy. An institution is democratic if it 
meets all the criteria of the framework. Thus it must have intent to adhere to 
democratic philosophies and principles and then it must implement the theory by 
using democratic methods and processes. 
Fundamental Rules of Democracy 
The Oxford English dictionary describes democracy as "government by the whole 
population, usually through elected representatives"3. John Stuart Mill defined 
democracy as "the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally 
represented.".4 Robert Dahl defined it as all the members governing the institution as 
political equals. 5 The fundamental rules of democracy are the popular control over 
public decisions and the equality of citizens to participate in that public control.6 The 
underlying premise of democracy is that the majority of people agree how to act on 
group decisions. 
2 Robert Dahl Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Norwegian University Press, Denmark, 1986), pp. 
191-225, 
3 Maurice White ( ed.), The Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, 7th Edition) 
4 J.S. Mill , Representative Government ( 1861 ), Chapter VII , "Of True and False Democracy; 
Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority Only. " 
5 Robert Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998) p.37 
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In an ideal democracy, people would assemble to discuss important issues and then 
decide as a collective or by majority how to proceed. Unfortunately, this ideal can 
only work on a small scale and is impractical on a national level. 7 Accordingly, viable 
alternatives to group assemblies are necessary for nations to decision make. 
Representative democracy is on alternative. 
Representative democracy is the election of officers, by the people, to make decisions 
for the people. Representative democracy emerged from assemblies in England during 
the reign of Edward I from 1272 to 1307.8 By the eighteenth century, the assemblies 
had developed into a constitutional monarchy with checks and balances. This is still 
largely the form of government that is considered democracy today. That is an 
elected, by the people, body of officers who make decisions for the nation. The 
officers' powers are fettered by checks and balances, namely by constitutional 
positioning of a head of state and of the judicial branch of government. 9 
Thus the foundations of fundamental rules can be said to be: 
Level One 
Fundamental 
Rules 
Democratic Principles 
Political Equality Majority Rule 
6 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance State of Democracy: Trends from the 
Pilot Countries (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2001 available at www.idea.int) 
7 Although, it is argued that due to rapid technological advances, government via referendum is more 
realistic today than ever before see the Yale Law School study on the impacts of technology on 
democracy at http: // islandia.law.yale.edu/ isp 
8 Robert Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998) p.21 
9 Palmer,(2004), pp.55-56, 286-289 
The principles of democracy make up Level Two. Institutions that are democratic 
contain an underlying set of democratic principles. The principles ensure that majority 
rule and political equality are carried out on fair and just terms. The principles 
proposed m this paper are: representation; participation; competition and 
accountability. 10 
The framework for Levels One and Two of democracy: 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Compet itive 
Principles 
Democratic Mechanisms 
Level Three of the democratic framework compnses the mechanisms needed for 
implementing the theory and principles. These are the processes and institutions that 
are utilised to form governments. 11 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
10 These principles have been developed and influenced by the writers analysed below see Rustow 
( 1967), Dahl (1986), Powell (1982), Mulgan (1989), and Beethan (IDEA) (200 I) . 
11 These mechanisms have been developed and influenced by the writers analysed below see Rustow 
(1967), Dahl ( 1986), Powell ( 1982), Mulgan (1989), and Beethan (IDEA) (200 I) 
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Level Three 
- mechanisms - mechanisms - mechanisms - mechanisms 
for ensuring for ensuring for for ensuring 
Democratic participation accountability representation competition 
Mechanisms 
All the practical implementation mechanisms necessary to ensure a democratic 
institution derive from either the two fundamental theories or from the four principles. 
There is no specific set of mechanisms needed for democracy. All that is required is 
that the mechanisms operationalise the fundamental rules in accordance with the 
principles of democracy. 
An attempt to establish criteria, without having regard to the principles, results in the 
creation of instruments that imply the principles but do not state what they are. Instead 
of establishing the principles first, and then working towards implementing those, 
commentators seem to use the mechanism in Level Three, as the criteria for testing 
democracy. What the commentators were really looking at was to see if the principles 
were being implemented through a set of outcomes based guidelines without 
acknowledging the existence of the principles. 
Thus some commentators have tried to establish tests looking at the how democracy is 
implemented instead of the why it is implemented. This makes a leap in logic between 
the theory (majority rule and political equality) and the implementation of the theory. 
The missing steps are the principles that the theory creates. The proposed framework 
shows that it is the principles that are implemented, not the theory. 
The next section tests the criteria of democracy suggested by some commentators 
against the framework proposed in this paper. 
The criteria established by commentators can be incorporated into either the two 
fundamental rules, the four principles or the underlying mechanisms or a mixture of 
the rules, principles and mechanisms. Some commentators have meshed the 
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fundamental rules of Level One with the principles of Level Two and the tools of 
Level Three. The majority of commentators fail to separate Level Two principles 
from the mechanisms that that are used to fulfil the requirements of Level Three. For 
instance freedom of the press is a part of actualising the principle of competition. 
Periodic elections are a way of implementing the principle of accountability. 
Dankwart Rustow 12 applied four criteria to determine the democracy of an institution. 
These are the free flow of information and the free expression of opinion; the 
competition of party programs and candidates for electoral approval; the control of the 
government by elected representatives; either (a) periodic changes in the composition 
of the ruling majority or (b) representation of all major electoral trends within it. 
Inserting Rustow' s work into the framework means separating his assertions about the 
underlying theory from the mechanisms he uses. In Level One there is majority rule 
and political equality. Rustow's analysis goes straight to matters in the second and 
third levels, when assessing the democratic nature of an institution he investigates the 
procedures of the institution and those surrounding the institution but fails to 
acknowledge the underlying assumptions. 
Analysing Rustow in the light of the second and third levels poses a significant 
problem. Rustow's criteria are a mixture of principles and mechanisms. For instance 
the free flow of information and the freedom of expression criteria fall into the 
principle of competition. Having freedom of information and expression increases 
political awareness and with increased political awareness comes the likelihood of 
dissent from the popular regime. Rustow' s criteria regarding the competition of party 
programs and candidates for electoral approval again fall under the principle of 
competition. His requirement for the control of the government by elected 
representatives is both inclusive of the first level need for majority rule and the second 
12 Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, DC, 
1967) pp. 94, 290 
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level principle of representation. Rustow' s requirement for periodic change is a part of 
the proposed principle of accountability. Periodic change enables voters to change 
representatives if they did not follow the will of the people during their term of 
government. Rustow's condition for the representation of all major electoral trends 
within an institution is incorporated in the representation principle, although from a 
more consociational democratic angle. 
Rustow's criteria can be mapped against the framework as follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
- representation - periodic -the control of -free flow of 
of all major changes in the the government information 
electoral trends composition of by elected -free 
within it the ruling representatives expression of 
Level Three majority opinion 
Democratic -competition 
Mechanisms of party 
programs 
-competitions 
candidates for 
electoral 
approval 
Robert Dahl's criteria for a democratic standard include 13 effective participation -
equal and effective opportunities for making views known to others; voting equality -
equal and effective opportunity to vote and all votes counted as equal; enlightened 
understanding - access to information; control over the agenda - choose what is 
13 Robert Dahl Democracy, liberty and Equality,(Norwegian University Press: Denmark, (1986), p. 
195 
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important; inclusion of adults - all adults included. Dahl ' s criteria assisted greatly in 
the building of the four core principles, as he tends to state the underlying issue and 
then move to explain how it is to be implemented. However, this does limit the impact 
of the principle significantly. For instance Dahl states that effective participation is 
imperative to a democratic institution, he then states this means equal and effective 
opportunities for making views known to others. However this definition fails to take 
into account other methods of participation, for example the duty on the institution to 
consult with affected parties of a proposed decision or the implied protection of 
political and civil rights that allow participation in the political process. 
Dahl also has a different approach regarding enlightened understanding. Dahl states 
that enlightened understanding means having access to information. The framework 
identifies enlightened understanding as an imperative to full participation in the 
electoral process and is therefore included in the participatory principle. Dahl ' s 
implementation of enlightened understanding is having access to information. The 
framework has having access to public information as part of the accountability 
measure and access to non-public information as part of the competition principle. 
This is because the different information of public records and official information 
insures that the institution is transparent and this leads to accountability. The non-
public information, such as access to a critical media, generates varying political ideas 
and political dissent which garners political diversity and fulfils the competition 
principle. 
Dahl ' s theory of voting equality - equal and effective opportunity to vote and all 
votes counted as equal is incorporated into the participatory principle. Dahl raises a 
significant issue for this thesis, that of all votes are counted equal or apportionment. 
Apportionment is going to be explained and analysed at depth later in this paper, 
however it is important to note that apportionment goes straight to the heart of 
participation principle and is one of the most difficult mechanisms of democracy to 
maintain. 
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Dahl ' s criteria can be mapped against the framework as follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
- effective - access to - control over - access to 
participation information the agenda information 
- equal and - choose what is 
effective important 
opportunities for 
making views 
known to others 
Level Three 
- voting equality 
Democratic 
- equal and 
Mechanisms 
effective 
opportunity to 
vote and all 
votes counted as 
equal 
- enlightened 
understanding -
inclusion of 
adults 
Bingham Powell established five criteria for democracy, 
14 these were the legitimacy 
of the government rests on a claim to represent the desires of its citizens; the 
organised arrangement that regulates this bargain of legitimacy is competitive 
elections; most adults can participate in the electoral process, both as voters and as 
candidates for important political office; citizens' votes are secret and not coerced; and 
citizens and leaders enjoy basic freedom of speech, press, assembly, and organisation. 
14 G. Bingham Powell , Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, 
MA, 1982) pp. 3, 5 
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Powell ' s criteria agam assesses democracy with a mixture of principles and 
implementation tools. He states that participation is a key requirement and then limits 
participation to voting and standing as candidates for office. In the framework, 
participation in an institution is wider than having access to electoral tools. 
Participation includes the right to be educated in the method of the electoral system, 
and the right to be consulted about decisions if they directly impede on your liberties. 
Powell introduces a key element to the democratic principles, that democratic 
legitimacy requires competitive political elections. This is important because while 
other commentators have stressed the significance of having periodic elections; 
Powell adds that it is also necessary for elections to be competitive. That vibrant 
competitiveness is in itself a cornerstone of a democratic process. Competition is an 
important element of a democratic institution because it helps insure against 
corruption; it reiterates the accountability of the governors; it encourages diversity in 
representatives; and competition also establishes the forms of the electoral process. 
Powell ' s analysis can be mapped against the framework as follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
- most adults -competitive - legitimacy of - the 
can participate political the government organised 
in the electoral elections rests on a claim arrangement 
process, both as to represent the that regulates 
Level Three 
voters and as desires of its this bargain 
Democratic 
candidates for citizens of legitimacy 
Mechanisms 
important is the 
political office competitive 
- citizens' votes political 
are secret arid election 
not coerced - citizens and 
leaders enjoy 
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basic freedom 
of speech, 
press, 
assembly, and 
organisation 
Richard Mulgan has defined the fundamental democratic principles that form the basis 
of representative government. These include the right to equal participation, equal 
power and power sharing, majority rule, freedom of political expression, protection of 
individual rights, protection of minority right and the right to exercise political 
power. 15 Mulgan ' s analysis is more focussed on the rights that democracy provides 
than other commentators. He states that democracy is inherently a system of rights 
and that civil and political rights are essential elements in the nature of democracy. 
Mulgan' s theory approaches democracy in a different way. Analysis of Mulgan' s 
freedom of speech criteria demonstrates his rights based approach. Dahl states that 
one of the core elements is the opportunities for making views known to others, 
Mulgan states that freedom of political expression is core. Both are essentially talking 
about the same element: the right to freedom of speech. However Mulgan defines it as 
an individual right, separate and distinct from state duties. This approach to 
democracy is classified a liberal rights theory. 
Mulgan' s analysis is so compactly interwoven with rights theory that a maJor 
assumption must be addressed, that of individual rights instead of group rights. 
Liberalism assumes that society is made up of individuals. The traditional opposing 
theory is that society is made up of groups based on different characteristics, for 
instance gender and ethnicity. 16 This theory will be examined and analysed in detail 
later in this paper. It is interesting that although liberalist, Mulgan does state that the 
15 Richard Mulgan, Democracy and Power in New Zealand, (2"d ed. 1989 Oxford University Press, 
Auckland), p. 16-23 
16 Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence, ( 1995) 
16 
rights of minorities are protected in a truly democratic institution, though this 
assertion assumedly follows the free market idea in public choice theory. 
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Due to Mulgan' s concentration on the individual rights that democracy bestows, his 
criterion falls mainly in the participation category. His rights analysis is categorised as 
fundamentally being the right to participate in political life. With that participation 
comes certain rights, for instance the civil rights like to be safe from arbitrary search 
and seizure. 
Mulgan ' s criteria can be mapped against the framework as follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental Politic
al Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
- the right to -equal power - majority rule - freedom of 
equal and power political 
participation sharing expression 
Level Three - protection of 
Democratic individual rights 
Mechanisms - protection of 
minority rights 
-right to exercise 
political power 
The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) utilise tools to do a 
broadband assessment of the extent of democracy in different countries. 
18 IDEA ·s 
analysis differs from the method here primarily because its purpose is different. IDEA 
17 The public choice theory is described at length in Andre Reeve and Alan Ware, Electoral Systems: A 
Comparative and Theoretical introduction, ( 1992) 
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are trying to test the democratic nature of whole institutions, this analysis is just 
simply defining democracy and then later will examine a specific electoral practice. 
IDEA looks at the minimum requirements that a state needs to be democratic and then 
works backwards. This analysis is looking at what democracy means and then later 
investigating whether or not the Maori seats can align with it. Accordingly, IDEA 
talks about requirements and standards and ways that these can be demonstrated. This 
paper looks at the underlying theme that democracy is trying to achieve and 
differentiates that from the mechanisms it uses. The major issue with different 
commentators' works is the muddling of mechanisms and themes. While IDEA do 
look at the "values"19 democracies must obtain, their criteria is too focussed towards 
testing to be used as part of the definition here. 
IDEA's underlying principles are also different from the philosophies used here. 
IDEA states that the underlying principles of democracy are popular control over 
public decision makers and decisions; and equality of respect and voice between 
citizens in the exercise of that control. IDEA' s versions of political equality and 
majority rule are different from the ones proposed here. Their definitions are more 
about ensuring participation and accountability and Jess emphasis on representative 
and competition. 
IDEA' s principles can fit into the framework as follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental 
Rules 
Political Equality 
(equality of respect and voice) 
Conclusion and proposed framework 
Majority Rule 
(popular control) 
18 
David Beetham, Sarah Bracking, lain Kearton and Stuart Weir, international IDEA Handbook on 
Democracy Assessment, The Hague: Kluwer Law International , (200 I) 
18 
Having investigated the analysis of commentators, it can be seen how the definitions 
of democracy used by all the commentators can be deconstructed down to the 
underlying theory and then categorised into four principles. Each commentator' s 
work can be interpreted to show that democratic principles are fundamental to 
bridging the gap between the theory of democracy and implementation of democracy. 
This means that there is a three step process; there is the theory of democracy, the 
principles derived from that theory and the implementation of those principles through 
mechanisms. The practices of democracy are divided onto the four principles as 
follows: 
Level One 
Fundamental Political Equality 
Majority Rule 
Rules 
Level Two 
Democratic Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Principles 
- mechanisms - mechanisms - mechanisms -mechanisms 
Level Three for ensuring for ensuring for for ensuring 
Democratic participation accountability representation competition 
Mechanisms 
Some of the mechanisms appear oxymoronic. At first glance it is difficult to ascertain 
how the protection of free press is weighed against the protection of a civil right like 
privacy. However, all the aspects of democracy must be looked at together and 
contested against each other. The theory of democracy, the principles of democracy 
and the mechanisms of democracy are a complete package. It is imperative to realise 
that the principles are complimentary and at the same time limiting of each other. 
19 Beethan, (200 I), p. 3 
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4. Democracy in New Zealand 
New Zealand is a representative democracy,2° based on foundations of egalitarianism 
and equality.2 1 New Zealand has a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral 
system. Under MMP each voter has two votes, one for a constituency representative 
and the other for a political party. Each political party gets seats in the House of 
Representatives proportional to the amount of party votes they receive. 
22 
Lijphart considers that New Zealand established one of the first genuine systems of 
democracy within the first two decades of the twentieth century.
23 Banducci and Karp 
agree with this and state that New Zealand is one of the oldest modem democracies, 
having a stable democratic system since full franchise in 1893. 
24 Dahl also concurs 
and rates New Zealand as one of the few countries that has been democratic for over 
· 25 sixty years. 
IDEA assessed New Zealand ' s democracy in 2002 and found that while New Zealand 
has some issues; its democracy is generally sound. 
26 IDEA' s criticisms of the state of 
New Zealand democracy arise from inequalities of minority groups,
27 with the 
exception of Maori because of the Maori seats. Similarly, the New Zealand Election 
20 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer, Bridled Power: New Zealand 's Constitution and Government, 
Oxford University Press: South Melbourne, (4th ed. 2004), p.4 
2 1 New Zealand Electoral Study, Electoral System Opinion and the Evolution of MMP: A Report to the 
Electoral Commission, Foundation for Research , Science and Technology: University of Waikato, 
(2000), 
22 Palmer, (2004), pp.13-14 
23 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven : Yale University Press, ( 1999), p.49. 
24 Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp, issues and Party Competition under Alternative Electoral Systems, 
Party Politics Vol 8. No. I pp. 123- 141 
25 Robert Dahl , How Democratic is the American Constitution, Yale Universi ty Press : New Haven, 
(2001), p. 164 
26 John Henderson and Paul Bellamy, Democracy in New Zealand: international IDEA Study, 
Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies and lntemational Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, (2002) 
27 Henderson, (2002), p. 27 ; p. 43 ; p. 47 
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Study commented that New Zealand's electoral system "does well" and meets 
proportional requirements. 28 
These assertions of New Zealand ' s democracy are supported by an investigation by 
the Bay of Plenty Regional Council on the constitutional and democratic legitimacy of 
Maori electorates for local government. The Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori 
Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 enabled the Council to establish Maori wards 
(constituencies) for their local elections. Before the enactment of this legislation, the 
Council commissioned Judge Trapski of the High Court to investigate whether the 
seats would be constitutionally and democratically sound.
29 Judge Trapski found that, 
given New Zealand' s particular interpretation of democracy, the proposal for Maori 
wards in local government was constitutionally sound and democratic. He found the 
proposed seats would be "in accordance with New Zealand' s constitutional principles 
and law".30 
The above research and analysis has stated periodically and clearly that New Zealand 
is a democratic country and the Maori seats are a part of that democracy. The United 
Nations even refers to the Maori seats as a positive example of a way to protect 
minorities in democracies. 31 
Regardless of these approvals of New Zealand ' s democratic nature, criticisms that the 
Maori seats are not democratic still persist. In the past year, the furrow that raised 
debate on the issue of the democratic nature of the Maori seats was a speech by Dr 
Don Brash, leader of the National Party, addressed at the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 
28 NZES, (2000), p.5 
29 Judge Peter J. Trapski , The Proposal to Establish a Maori Constituency for Environment Bay of 
Plenty (The Bay of Plenty Regional Council), Report from Hearings Commissioner, (6 August 1998), 
available on request from Environment Bay of Plenty 
30 Trapski, ( 1998), p. 9 
3 1 Dr Fernand de Varennes, "Towards effective political participation and representation of minorities", 
Working paper for United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Working Group on 
Minorities, Fourth session, 25 - 29 May 1998, E/CN .4/Sub.2/ AC.5/1 998/WP.4 
21 
January 2004.32 Dr Brash stated that he believed that New Zealand should be "moving 
forward into the new century as a modem, democratic and prosperous nation". Dr 
Brash also stated that if elected as Prime Minister he would remove the anachronism 
of the Maori seats in the House of Representatives, inferring that the seats are not 
democratic. In his concluding remarks, he stated that New Zealand must build a 
modem, prosperous, democratic nation with one rule for all, again implying the 
existence of the Maori seats is evidence that the fundamental principle of one person 
one vote is being contravened and further, that that is undemocratic. 
Politician and academic Wayne Mapp has also criticised the democratic nature of the 
seats an d has stated that the Maori have a privileged constitutional status and that this 
runs counter to democracy. 33 Commentator David Thornton has stated that the Maori 
seats blemishes New Zealand's representative democracy. 34 Politician Winston 
Peters, when referring to the introduction of Maori wards in the Bay of Plenty, said 
that the seats were undemocratic and what is needed is "one system of representation 
r for all New Zealanders.". ) 
There are a number of well canvassed arguments against the Maori seats, these 
include: 36 
• Every member of society should have equal voting power or 'one person, one 
vote'; 
• Under MMP the seats hold too much power for a minority group and therefore 
the vote in the Maori electorates have more value; 
• MMP should be able to represent minority interests; 
32 Dr Don Brash, Nationhood, Speech at Orewa Rotary Club, 27 January 2004, available at 
www.national.org.nz or from the National Party National Headquarters, PO Box 1155, Wellington 
33 Wayne Mapp, 'Time for constitutional clarity ', in New Zealand Law Review, LexisNexis (May 2003) 
p. 148 
34 David Thornton, ' Another attack on one man, one vote principle ' in The New Zealand Herald28 
June 2000 
35 Rt Hon Winston Peters, media release, 24 July 2003, available on www.nzfirst.org.nz 
36 Report of the MMP Review Committee, Inqui,y into the Review of MMP, Order of the House of 
Representatives: Wellington, (200 I), p.20 
22 
• Under MMP there has been substantial Maori representation outside the Maori 
seats; and 
• The seats are based on a racial division and this fosters racial disharmony. 
The criticisms of the Maori seats fit into the framework: 
Level One Political Equality Majority Rule 
Fundamental - equal voting power - the seats hold too much power for 
Rules a minority group 
Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
- The seats are - MMP should be 
Level Two based on a racial able to represent 
Democratic 
division and this minority 
fosters racial interests 
Principles disharmony - Under MMP there 
has been 
substantial Maori 
representation 
outside the Maori 
seats 
- mechanisms - mechanisms - mechanisms -mechanisms 
Level Three for ensuring for ensuring for for ensuring 
Democratic participation accountability representation competition 
Mechanisms 
There are also a number of vocal arguments in favour of the Maori seats, including: 
• The seats are guaranteed under Article III of the Treaty of Waitangi37; 
• The seats hold historical mana;38 
• Maori will decide themselves, via the Maori Electoral Option, when the seats 
are no longer necessitated; and 
• The seats ensure a Maori voice in Parliament. 
37 Simon Reeves, To Honour the Treaty, Earth Restoration Ltd: Auckland, (2°d ed. 1996) 
38 Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga, the Politics of Maori Self Determination, Oxford 
University Press: New Zealand, ( 1998) 
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This paper is not going to concentrate on the pros or cons of retaining the Maori seats 
but is going to analyse whether the seats are democratic. While it is acknowledged 
that there are various rationales for removing and retaining the seats that are outside 
of democratic critique, those questions will not be examined here. 
From the above indicators there are two distinct ways that it has been said that the 
seats are undemocratic. These are that the seats breach the 'one person, one vote' rule 
and that non-geographic constituencies are not democratic. The 'one person, one vote' 
rule can be broken into two different parts: political equality and apportionment. The 
democratic nature of non-geographic constituencies or 'identity representation' will 
be analysed separately. 
24 
5. Short history of the Maori seats 
In Article III of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori were guaranteed the same "rights and 
privileges" as British subjects. The Waitangi Tribunal has stated that Article III 
established an obligation on the Crown to protect the citizenship rights of Maori.
39 
However in 1840, two distinct and separate nations existed in New Zealand. Although 
Maori were British subjects, they lived and operated outside of British rule and law, 
impeding any attempts of British government and control. 
However during the 1840s and 1850s when land was traded to the Crown, British 
control was able to be extended to that land.
40 Therefore the sale of land was, in 
essence, a cessation of political control. The colonists ' desire for the expediency of 
the sale of Maori land led to the Native Lands Acts 1862 and 1865. These Acts 
abolished the Crown' s pre-emptive right to buy land as stipulated in Article II of the 
Treaty of Waitangi and created individualisation of title upon application.
41 Because 
when land was traded political control was extended to that land, the colonists ' rapid 
land accumulation also meant the rapid accumulation of political control. 
Meanwhile due to the Constitution Act 1852, most Maori were still effectively 
excluded from the political process. The Constitution Act established vague tentacles 
of democracy in New Zealand by creating an electoral system with a central 
assembly.42 Voters were males over the age of 21 years who had property holdings 
within an electorate.43
 Maori males were not explicitly excluded under the Act, but 
because Maori held property communally and it was not registered, they were 
39 Waitangi Tribunal, WA I 413 Miiori Electoral Option Report, 1994, Brookers, Wellington 
40 B. J. Dalton, War and Politics in New Zealand, 1885-1 870, (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 
1967) 
41 Waitangi Tribunal , WAJ 413 Miiori Electoral Option Report, 1994, Brookers, Wellington, p. 5 
42 Niell Atkinson, Adventures on Democracy: A history of the vote in New Zealand, University of 
Otago Press, Dunedin (2003), p. 21 
43 Atkinson , (2003), p.23 
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effectively excluded.44 This led, among other events, to Maori attempts to create an 
independent political system during the 1850s and 1860s.
45 Examples of this are the 
Kingitanga movement and the attempts to form a Maori parliament. However, these 
endeavours were never recognised by the colonial government and Maori were 
necessitated to lobby for representation in Parliament.
46 This lobbying, combined with 
a "thread of idealism"47 and sense of unfairness eventually led to the Maori 
Representation Act 1867. 
The Maori Representation Act 1867 granted the franchise to Maori men over the age 
of 21 years. It divided the country geographically into four Maori districts. The 
preamble of the Act states that the seats were "temporary provisions"
48 to enable 
special representation of Maori. It was never intended that the seats remain because it 
was assumed that the individualisation of land would enfranchise Maori over time. 
Those first seats were not allocated proportionately as 56,000 Maori were represented 
by 4 Maori seats and 171,000 Europeans were represented by 72 seats.
49 
Even disregarding the malapportionment of the seats, there were serious differences 
between the European and Maori seats. Maori Members were chosen at hui by a show 
of hands, there was no registration of voters and the choice of Members was 
dominated by hapu and iwi preferences. 
50 Inside the House, Maori Members did not 
have a substantive impact on the proceedings of the House. In the Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System, Professor Sorenson goes as far to state that the 
44 M.P.K. Sorenson, ' A History of Maori Representation in Parliament', in Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System, Towards a Beller Democracy, (1986), AJHR, Appendix B, B-13 
45 Sorenson, (1886), B-15 to B-28 
46 Sorenson, ( 1986), B-61 
47 Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, (Allen and Unwin Port Nicholson Press, Wellington. 1987) 
p. 184 
48 Maori Representation Act 1867, preamble 
49 D. Ian Pool, The Maori Population of New Zealand 1769-1971, Auckland University Press, (1977), 
p.237 
5° Catherine J loms, ' Dedicated Parliamentary Seats for Indigenous Peoples: Political Representation as 
an Element of Indigenous Self-Determination ', in Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 
Volume I 0, number 4 (December 2003) 
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Maori vmce m Parliament was often ineffective and while Maori Members did 
advocate on Maori issues, little attention was paid to them. 
51 
The Act extended the Maori seats in 1872 and then indefinitely in 1876, due to fears 
that Maori would enrol in general seats and, given their continued population 
supremacy, put the seats "in jeopardy"
52 by electing Maori in them. 
In 1893 Maori women were granted the franchise alongside their non-Maori 
counterparts. This effectively doubled the constituency of the Maori seats. New 
Zealand women were the first women in the world to gain franchise, but as equally 
important and often understated, Maori women were the first indigenous women and 
'women of colour' to receive the vote. 
53 
The 'one man, one vote' rule for property owners was adopted in the Representation 
Amendment Act 1889. This meant that property owners with holdings on more than 
one district had to decide where to cast their vote. This stopped Maori from being 
eligible for the European roll by virtue of property interests and ended any duality of 
voting. 54 In 1896, property rights qualifications for voting eligibility were abolished as 
well, this meant that all citizens were eligible to vote and universal suffrage was 
established. 
This ended what has been termed New Zealand's "semidemocratic"
55 century. These 
changes implemented equality as being the cornerstone of legitimate democracy in 
New Zealand and, since that time, being undemocratic has become synonymous with 
51 Sorenson, (1986), B-25, a significant example of this is Maori Members opposition to the Native 
Land Acts, which were designed to facilitate European purchase of Maori land. 
52 Sorenson, ( 1986), B-24 
53 Suffrage Centennial Local History Project, Maori women and the franchise, Women's Studies Dept. , 
Victoria University of Wellington, (1993) 
54 Sorenson, ( 1986), B-30 
55 Leslie Lipson, The politics of equality: New Zealand's adventures in democracy, University of 
Chicago Press (l 948) p. 167 
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being unequal. 56 While the universal franchise and the removal of property 
qualifications moved New Zealand to a more democratic nation, the 
malapportionment of the Maori seats was a blemish on this democracy. 
These legislative changes also fully "segregated"
57 New Zealand electoral law and 
cemented the place of Maori in the electoral system. Maori were categorised and 
classed outside general electoral law. 
The most visible symptom of this segregation, apart from the malapportionment, was 
the difference between Maori and non-Maori voting methods. In 1870 non-Maori 
voted for the first time by secret ballot, 
58 however Maori were voting by a show of 
hands until 191059 and subsequently by declaration to the returning officer, this 
continued until 193 7. Until 1950, Maori also did not cast their vote on election day, 
but on the day before. Sullivan points out the differences between how Maori and 
non-Maori cast their votes was not merely symbolic. Sullivan contends that the secret 
ballot ensures the right to vote without undue influence.
60 The ability to easily 
influence another directly impacts upon the ability of an institution to practice 
democracy. 
Despite the inequitable apportionment and continual Maori protestations, the number 
of Maori seats in Parliament remained fixed at four, for over one hundred years.
61 
When considering how it was that the Maori seats remained at four for so long, the 
fact that from 1943 to 1993, the seats were held by the Labour Party must be taken 
into account. The Labour Party secured the Maori vote by an alliance with the Ratana 
56 Lipson, (1948) 
57 Sorenson, ( 1986), B-30 
58 Atkinson, (2003), p. 55 
59 Ann Sullivan, 'Effecting Change through Electoral Politics : cultural identity and the Maori franchise ' 
Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 11 2, no . 3 (Sept. 2003) 
60 Sullivan, p. 221 
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Movement in 193 8 after a Labour government introduced the equal treatment of 
Maori and non-Maori in the welfare system.
62 Unfortunately this alliance effectively 
meant that Maori were only substantially represented in four Governments between 
1938 and 1993, effectively shutting Maori out of policy making decisions.
63 The 
continued alignment of Maori with the Labour party may have inadvertently voided 
any possibility of a greater equality and equity in apportionment. However, in 1975 
the Labour Party rewarded their Maori supporters. The Electoral Amendment Act 
1975 introduced the determination of the number of Maori seats to be done on the 
number of Maori on the Maori electoral roll. This meant that the number of Maori 
seats would directly correspond to the number of Maori enrolled on the Maori roll, the 
same as the non-Maori roll and seats ratio had been operating since 1896. 
This victory was short-lived as following a change of Government that same year, the 
amendments were repealed and in 1976 the number of Maori seats was again fixed at 
four. This is without one election taking place that included a number of seats 
proportional to the population. 
However other clauses of the 1975 Act remained, including the changes to what it 
meant to be Maori. Prior to 1975, to be eligible for the Maori roll , a voter would have 
to be of half or more Maori descent. Voters with half or less descent were on the 
European roll and "half-castes" could chose to be on either. 
64 Also retained was the 
Maori Electoral Option, which continued to give Maori the option to be on either the 
General roll or the Maori roll. However, while there was now an element of individual 
autonomy in making that choice, as the number of Maori on the roll had no bearing on 
61 John Wilson, "The Origins of the Maori Seats", Parliamentary Library, Wellington, (2003) available 
at www.clerk.parliament. govt.nz 
62 Ann Sullivan and Jack Vowles, ' Realignment? Maori and the 1996 election ', Voters 'victory? New 
Zealand's first election under proportional representation ( 1998) 
63 There were 4 Maori Members of Parliament who were not in the Labour Party between 1938 and 
1993 as per John Wilson, (2003). The effectiveness of those member in advocating the advancement of 
Maori has been repeatedly questioned, see Ann Sullivan, "Effecting Change Through Electoral Politics: 
Cultural Identity and the Maori Franchise", Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 112, no. 3 (Sept. 
2003) p. 219-237 
29 
the number of electoral districts, aside from identity representation, there was little 
point in Maori being on the Maori roll. 
65 
Key modern events that have shaped New Zealand democracy 
In 1986 the Labour Government established a Royal Commission to do an in-depth 
investigation of the electoral system as a whole. The Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System (as it became) was tasked with investigating and reporting on the 
New Zealand electoral system and making recommendations to Government for 
changes to the electoral system.
66 The Commission had a broad job description that 
included Parliamentary and political arrangements and the entire electoral system. 
67 
One of the tasks of the Commission was to investigate and report on the "nature and 
basis of Maori representation in Parliament" . 
68 
The Commission found that New Zealand' s voting system had "real deficiencies"
69 
and that it "denies effective Maori representation".
70 The Commission recommended 
that that Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system be adopted. The Commission 
also stated that this system would enable the fair representation of Maori and as a 
consequence the Maori seats would no longer be required to ensure adequate 
representation. 
64 Niell Atkinson, (2003) 
65 Donna Durie-Hall, "My reasons for choosing the Maori roll" , a non-published paper prepared fo
r the 
Maori Congress, 14 January 1994 
66 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy, (1986), AJHR, xii i 
67 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, (1986), p. I 
68 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, (1986), xiii 
69 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, ( 1986), 2.56 
70 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, (1986), 2.57 (Report's italics) 
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However, the Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry into the Report of the Royal 
Commission highlighted the fact that MMP would not necessarily provide any 
guarantees that Maori participation in Parliament would be enhanced. 
71 
After two national referenda choosing a change to MMP, the Government approved 
its introduction in the Electoral Reform Bill 1992. 
72 The original Bill followed the 
Royal Commission recommendations that if MMP was adopted the Maori seats 
should be abandoned. During the public submission process the "overwhelming 
majority of submissions received recommended that the Maori seats be retained until 
Maori themselves decide whether they should be abolished or changed".
73 There were 
few Maori submissions to the Select Committee, so the Committee recommended that 
a consultation process with Maori should be undertaken. Over the following months, 
20 hui were held throughout New Zealand and there was a clear view in them that 
Maori wanted the seats retained. The Select Committee' s report recommended the 
continuation of the Maori seats, m spite of the Royal Commission' s 
recommendations. 
74 
The Electoral Act 1993 retained the Maori seats and also reintroduced the 1975 
version of the Maori Electoral Option where the number of Maori seats is determined 
proportional to Maori on the roll. The Maori Electoral Option being the quinquennial 
ability of Maori to choose to be on either the Maori role or the General role
75
. The 
current option is based on the original short-lived 1975 version, where the number of 
Maori seats in Parliament is determined by the number of Maori on the Maori role. 
This is done by dividing the Maori electoral population by the quota for general 
71 Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, (1986), Report of th
e 
Electoral Law Committee, New Zealand-House of Representatives (1988) 1.17B Report of the 
Electoral 
Law Committee on the Electoral Reform Bill , New Zealand-House of Representatives (1993) I. l 7C 
72 The Electoral Reform Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 15 December 1
992 
73 Report of the Electoral Law Committee on the Electoral Reform Bill , New Zealand-House of 
Representatives (1993) l.17C, p. 5 
74 Report of the Electoral Law Committee on the Electoral Reform Bill, New Zealand-House of 
Representatives (1993) I. I 7C, p. 5 
75 Electoral Act 1993, section 77 
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electoral districts in the South Island ( currently set at 16). 
76 In December 1993 the 
first option was announced in a notice in the New Zealand Gazette
77
. The option was 
the required two month period running from February 1994. 
In January 1994, following resolutions at national hui, a Waitangi Tribunal Claim was 
brought by Hare Puke on behalf of iwi and Maori authorities (including the New 
Zealand Maori Council, the National Maori Congress and the Maori Women' s 
Welfare League) regarding the Option. The claim was that the Crown had an 
obligation under both the Treaty of Waitangi and the Electoral Act 1993 to protect the 
right of Maori to be represented in Parliament and that this is exemplified in the Maori 
Electoral Option. 78 The claimants submitted that the Minister of Justice had not 
provided sufficient opportunity for Maori to exercise their option. 
79 Claimant Dr 
Ngatata Love argued that the Maori Electoral Option was of vital importance because: 
"In 1994, after 127 years of a system universally accepted as being 'not fair ' 
and 'not on a proper basis', actions by Maori have provided an historical 
opportunity for Maori to have choice on how their electoral representation 
should be. "80 
The Waitangi Tribunal found that the Crown is under "an obligation to protect Maori 
citizenship rights"81 and Maori rights to political representation. The Tribunal also 
found that as long as the Crown took reasonable steps in the circumstances to protect 
those rights, it had fulfilled its Treaty obligations. 
76 ss 45(30) and 35(3)(b) of the Electoral Act 1993 
77 New Zealand Gazette, 22 December 1993 
78 Waitangi Tribunal, WAI 413 Miiori Electoral Option Report, 1994, Brookers, Wellington, p. l 
79 Margaret Wilson, "Reconfiguration of New Zealand 's Constitutional Institutions, Waikato law 
Review, ( 1997), vol 5, p. 18 
so Submission made by Dr Ngatata Love to the Waitangi Tribunal on the Maori Electoral Option 
hearing on 27 January 1994 
8 1 Waitangi Tribunal, WAI 413 Maori Electoral Option Report, 1994, Brookers, Wellington, p. 15 
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The case was taken to the High Court and was determined on the basis of the 
reasonableness of the Minister of Justice's determination about the resources.
82 The 
Courts chose to examine the matter as a matter of administrative law and not to 
inquire into the constitutional validity of the aspirations of Maori tino rangatiratanga. 
The inaugural Maori Electoral Option produced five Maori seats. The second Maori 
Electoral Option was run by the former Waitangi Tribunal claimant Dr Ngatata Love 
and produced six Maori seats. The last Maori Electoral Option in 2001 produced 
another seat. The Maori electoral districts in Parliament now make up seven out of 
120 districts. 
Section 264 of the Electoral Act 1993 required the government to form a Select 
Committee in 2000 to review the electoral system four years after the introduction of 
MMP. The Committee was to consider the operation of the electorate boundary 
setting process, the provisions relating to Maori representation and whether there 
should be a further referendum on changes to the electoral system. The Committee 
was instructed to give recommendations in unanimity or near-unanimity. 
Unfortunately, the Committee failed to reach agreement on "a number of significant 
issues". 83 These issues included whether or not the Maori seats should be retained. 
Regardless of the lack of recommendations the report of the Committee gave an 
interesting insight into the current state of electoral law. In particular, the public 
submissions on the Maori seats gave a cross-section of the divided public opinion on 
their existence. The submissions to the Select Committee advocating for the 
abolishment of the seats stated:
84 
82 Taiaroa v Minister of Justice [ 1995] I NZLR ~ 11 and Taiaroa v Minister of Justice [ 1995] 2 NZLR 
I 
83 Report of the MMP Review Committee, Inquiry into the Review of MMP,2001, Order of the House 
of Representatives, Wellington, p. 5 
84 Report of the MMP Review Committee, Inquiry into the Review of MMP,200 I , Order of the House 
of Representatives, Wellington, p.20 
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• Every member of society should have equal voting power or ' one person, one 
vote ' ; 
• Under MMP the seats hold too much power for a minority group and therefore 
the vote in the Maori electorates have more value; 
• MMP should be able to represent minority interests; 
• Under MMP there has been substantial Maori representation outside the Maori 
seats; and 
• The seats are based on a racial division and this fosters racial disharmony. 
Despite the numerous attempts since their inception to abolish the Maori seats, they 
remain and the number of seats grows every time there is a Maori Electoral Option. In 
2000 the New Zealand Electoral Study found that public opinion was strongly but 
fairly evenly divided on whether to retain or abolish the seats. In their survey, 41 % of 
respondents felt that the seats should be abolished and 4 7% of respondents felt that 
the seats needed to be retained. 85 However, their popularity or unpopularity aside, the 
question at the heart of this debate is whether or not the seats are democratic. 
85 NZES, (2000), p. 34 
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6. One Person, one vote rule 
This paper has looked at the history of New Zealand democracy and at the history of 
Maori seats position in that system, the question remains whether or not the Maori 
seats are democratic, that is whether they have democratic legitimacy. The assertions 
that the Maori seats are not democratic because they breach the 'one person, one vote' 
rule and because non-geographic representation is not democratic. 
86 
The 'one person, one vote' rule is the democratic philosophy of political equality. 
Lijphart stated that there are three common mechanisms to actualise political equality. 
These are simply majority constituencies, semiproportional and proportional
87
• New 
Zealand utilises the semiproportional system Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) 
to achieve this equity. Under MMP, voter participation is optimised because the party 
votes are considered to be of equal weight
88 but the votes still have a direct 
representative in the form of a constituency representative. Under Part 6 of the 
Electoral Act 1993, voters get two votes, one for a political party and the other for a 
candidate standing in their electoral district. Because the criticism of breaches of the 
'one person, one vote' theory relates to New Zealand electoral districts and not about 
the party vote, this analysis concentrates on electoral districts (also referred to as 
constituencies). 
An examination of the definition of 'one person, one vote' leads to two different, but 
not opposing, definitions. First is the electoral theory definition of 'one person, one 
vote' and how this relates to the jurisprudence of apportionment. Essentially, the 
electoral theory definition of 'one person, one vote' is that all electoral districts within 
86 As per Chapter 3 of this paper, Democracy in New Zealand 
87 Arend Lijphart "Proportionality by Non-PR Methods" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Ed.) 
Electoral law and their Political Consequences, Agathon Press, New York (1994), P. 114 
88 This assertion was made by the Royal Commission when comparing the Mixed Member system 
against the Single-Transferable Vote system regarding voter participation, see Royal Commission on 
the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy, ( 1986), AJHR, p. 57 
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a state must contain the same number of voters. The second interpretation of 'one 
person, one vote' is that all voters are equal. The definition of equality is explored in 
Chapter 8 of this paper, but essentially it has been previously defined as procedural 
equality or substantive equality. Procedural equality is treating everyone the same, or 
like cases alike, and substantive equality is ensuring that the outcomes are fair. 
36 
7. One person, one vote - Electoral Theory 
This section develops a definition of 'one person, one vote' and then examines the 
different commentators definitions of 'one person, one vote' to ensure their themes are 
captured. Then the New Zealand experience of electoral district voting will be 
assessed against the electoral theory definition, in particular examining the Maori 
seats in light of this definition. 
Different commentators have developed different interpretations of 'one person, one 
vote' . Mill stated that "one man, one vote; one vote, one value"89 is the cornerstone to 
democratic process. The underlying theme for this rule is ' one, person, one vote ' 
relates to the equality of votes. The 'one person, one vote' apportionment rule is 
situated in the democratic framework as belonging all three levels. In the first level as 
political equality; in the second level as both participatory and representativenes; and 
in the operating third level as the division into equal electoral districts. The three 
levels are read together: electoral districts enable participation and representation; 
which in tum enable majority rule and political equality. 
'One person, one vote' in democratic.framework 
tst Level 
Fundamental Political Equality Majority Rule 
Rules 
Participatory Representative 
2nd Level each person contributes equally elected representatives 
Democratic to decide the representatives 
Principles 
89 Quoted in Peter J Taylor, Graham Gudgin and RJ Johnston "The Geography of Representation: A 
Review of Recent Findings" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (Ed.) Electoral Law and their 
Political Consequences, Agathon Press, New York (1994), P. 190 
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3rd Level 
Democratic 
Mechanisms 
Equal Electoral Districts 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this work, 'one person, one vote' is defined here as 
each person contributes equally to decide the representatives and electoral districts 
must reflect this. 
The operationalisation of the theory is the mechanism used to define electoral 
districts. Commentators express definitions of the theory, or their version of it, in a 
variety of different ways. Like the overall analysis of democracy, definitions of 'one 
person, one vote' fall into different categories. Some commentators define the concept 
of 'one person, one vote' and some define the mechanisms for it realising the theory. 
Others use a combination of theory and mechanisms to demonstrate what they mean 
by 'one person, one vote'. 
Lani Guinier asserts that the details of one person, one vote and all votes count is 
broken down to mean that each constituency contains the same amount of people; 
each person within the constituency has the same opportunities to vote for someone to 
represent the constituency; and each representative represents the same number of 
constituents. 90 Guinier' s interpretation is about the mechanisms of ensuring that each 
person contributes equally to decide the representatives. Her definition assumes that 
voters are divided into constituencies and that representatives are elected to represent 
that particular constituency. Guinier' s definition mainly concentrates on the 
mechanisms for ensuring 'one person, on~ vote'. However, analysis of her mechanisms 
demonstrates that she is attempting, through defining methods, to achieve equity. By 
stating that constituencies must be the same size, that everyone has the same 
opportunities to vote and each representative represents the same number of 
constituents, Guinier is trying to implement political equality through electoral 
90 Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy, 
The Free Press, New York (1994), p. 123 
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mechanisms. The entire point of her mechanisms is to form equity between voters 
through equal constituencies and representatives. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
work, Guinier' s work is categorised in the third level and is about operations, but the 
aim of her mechanisms is to enable political equality as per the first level. 
Alfred De Grazia91 states that 'one person, one vote' is the division of a jurisdiction 
into constituencies, some of whose members are enabled to participate in a 
designation of officers of the jurisdiction. It is an absolute requirement of 
representative government. De Grazia' s definition does not sit perfectly with the 
definition being used here. De Grazia is not inclusive of all members of the 
represented population. It is interesting, given that De Grazia was writing in the 
1960s, that his definition of voting entitlement is qualified by stating that only some 
members are able to vote. While it is acknowledged that some members of society, for 
instance those under the age of 18 years, are not eligible to vote, contemporary 
democracy requires that all members of society are enfranchised. 92 This debate is 
examined in more detail in the analysis of the literal interpretation of 'one person, one 
vote'. De Grazia' s definition does not fit in with the underlying principle at work here, 
that of equal participation of all members. 
New Zealander Richard Mulgan states that in the ballot box each person' s vote counts 
equally with everyone else' s.93 The meaning of Mulgan's definition is virtually the 
same as the one developed here. Mulgan' s definition supposes that universal 
enfranchisement and equal contribution are vital to 'one person, one vote'. Further, 
Mulgan states that 'one person, one vote, one vote, one value ' are "fundamental 
assumptions"94 of the New Zealand political system. Although it should be 
acknowledged that this writing was done before the introduction of MMP into New 
91 Alfred De Grazia, Apportionment and Representative Government, Frederick A Praeger Inc, New 
York, (1963), p. 18 
92 For example see Article 25 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
93 Mulgan, (1989), p. 81 
94 M ulgan, ( 1989), p. 46 
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Zealand, the workings of electoral districts, except for the number of Maori seats, 
have not changed since the transference from the first past the post system. 
Balinski and Young assert95 that no man should have a greater voice than any other. 
This is compatible with the definition used here. Balinski and Young concur that each 
person contributes equally to decide the representatives. However, their definition 
expands into the mechanics of actualising this theory. They say that each state should 
receive a number of representatives in proportion to its population or a party in 
proportion to its total vote. This goes towards the notion of that equal participation, in 
constituencies this means that each constituency must be roughly the same size. That 
the 'one person, one vote' rule is about making a precise allocation of seats to states or 
to parties. This is core to the electoral theory interpretation of 'one person, one vote', 
that not only does each voter cast one vote but that the effect of the votes is the same. 
Balinski and Young argue that this is ensured by having constituencies of a state each 
holding the same amount of voters. 
The maJor source of jurisprudence surrounding the 'one person, one vote' 
apportionment rule was developed in the Supreme Court in the United States of 
America, beginning with the case Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964 ).96 In 
Reynolds, the Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren stated that the one person, one 
vote principle was " ... at the heart of Lincoln' s vision of ' government of the people, 
by the people, [and] for the people".97 Reynolds, and the cases following, held that 
membership numbers of voting districts could severely impact on the expression of 
the fundamental right to vote; the more unequal the voting districts, the more diluted 
the representation is. That each constituency contains the same amount of people is 
95 Balinksi and Young (1982), p. I 
96 For a breakdown and analysis of Reynolds v Sims and the following cases see Richard L. Hasen, The 
Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality fro m Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, New York 
University Press, New York (2003) 
97 Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (l 964)rn p. 568, quoted from Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court 
and Election l aw: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, New York University Press, 
New York, (2003) 
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the theory of apportionment98 . Apportionment states that fair representation must be 
in proportion to population basis99 . Reynolds and the cases following that follow 
highlight that, in constituency voting, in order to ensure political equality all the 
constituencies must contain the same number of voters. 
Commenting on the United States cases, Knechtle 100 states that the right to vote for 
people who make laws is the paramount human right. He continues that 'one person, 
one vote' concerns apportionment and the prevention of dilution of votes. Knechtle 
examines the effects of the 2000 United States presidential election on the 'one 
person, one vote' concept. He states that the Supreme Court case resulting from the 
Florida elections, Bush v Gore 53 l U.S. 121 S.Ct 525(2000), extends the 'one person, 
one vote' from the apportionment cases to include administration of elections. 
Knechtle demonstrates the assertion made in the level approach, that equal numbers of 
voters in constituencies is a method of ensuring political equality. 
Application to New Zealand Electoral Districts 
In order to determine if the Maori seats do not break the apportionment rule, that is 
that all constituencies contain relatively the same number of voters, the Maori 
electoral districts should contain the same amount of members as the general electoral 
districts. Under sections 36 and 45(7) of the Electoral Act 1993, the Representation 
Commission (who set electoral boundaries) may fit the boundaries to accommodate 
certain features, for example geographic features , but the districts cannot deviate more 
than five percent different from the South Island quota. 101 The South Island quota is 
98 Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the ideal of One Man, One 
Vote, Yale University Press, West Hanover Massachusetts, (1982) 
99 Balinksi and Young ( 1982), p. 95 
100 John C Knechtle, "'One Person, one vote" Magnified ', Florida Coastal Law Journal , Vo! 11 :3 81 , 
2001 
10 1 Section 36 of the Electoral Act 1993 
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rendered by dividing the general electoral population 102 of the South Island by sixteen. 
In 2002 the South Island general electoral population was 868,923. 103 Therefore the 
quota is 54,308. 
South Island Quota 
868,923 -;- 16 = 54,308 
The amount of Maori seats is determined by dividing the Maori electoral 
population 104 by the South Island quota. After the last Maori Electoral Option in 2001 , 
Maori electoral population was 371,690. 105 Therefore the current quota is for the 
Maori seats is 6.8. 
Maori Electoral Districts 
371,690-;- 54,308 = 6.8 
Under section 45(3) (b) the fraction is rounded up and the amount of Maori seats is 
determined to be seven. This formula established the following electoral districts: Te 
Tai Tokerau; Tamaki Makaurau; Pare Hauraki-Pare Waikato; Waiariki; Te Tai 
Hauauru; Te Tai Rawhiti; and Te Tai Tonga. The population of the Maori electoral 
districts is: 106 
Maori Electoral District Maori Electoral District population 
Te Tai Tokerau 51 ,526 
Tamaki Makaurau 52,390 
Pare Hauraki-Pare Waikato 52,695 
102 The General Electoral Population is the total resident population (from the last census), excluding 
the Maori electoral population as per section 3 of the Electoral Act 1993 
103 Statistics are from the Electoral Commission and available on www.elections.on2.nz 
104 The Maori electoral population is defined under section 3 of the Electoral Act 1993. The Maori 
electoral population is all the Maori on the Maori roll , a proportion of Maori who are not registered as 
electors of any electoral district and a proportion of Maori under 18 years of age 
105 Statistics are from the Electoral Commission and available on www.elections.org.nz 
106 This information was gathered from Statistics New Zealand and are from the Representation 
Commission ' s divisions in 2002, see www.stats. govt.nz 
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Waiariki 54,344 
Te Tai Hauauru 53 ,935 
Te Tai Rawhiti 54,650 
Te Tai Tonga 52,003 
The average population of the Maori Electoral Districts is 53 ,078. This is within five 
percent of the South Island Electoral quota. 
The amount of North Island seats is determined by dividing the general electoral 
population of the Island by the South Island quota. After the last census the general 
electoral population of the North was 2,497,596. Therefore the quota is 45.9. 
North Island Electoral Districts 
2,497,596+ 54,308 = 45 .9 
Accordingly, there are currently 46 electorates in the North Island, these are:
107 
General Electoral District General Electoral District population 
Northland 54,093 
Whangarei 54,146 
Rodney 52,881 
East Coast Bays 56,750 
Northcote 54,684 
North Shore 56,035 
Helensville 52,288 
Waitakere 51 ,892 
Te Atatu 53 ,035 
New Lynn 52,956 
Mt Albert 52,607 
Mt Roskill 52,086 
Auckland Central 53 ,682 
Epsom 54,502 
Tarnaki 56,225 
107 This information was gathered from Statistics New Zealand and are from the Representation 
Commission 's divisions in 2002, see www.stats.govt.nz 
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Maungakiekie 51,903 
Pakuranga 56,528 
Manukau East 56,366 
Mangere 56,823 
Manurewa 56,847 
Clevedon 56,157 
Port Waikato 56,866 
Piako 56,518 
Hamilton West 56,682 
Hamilton East 55,239 
Coromandel 53,688 
Tauranga 52,760 
Bay of Plenty 52,593 
Rotorua 53,665 
Taupo 52,351 
Taranaki-King Country 53,805 
New Plymouth 52,204 
Whanganui 56,081 
Waioeka 56,643 
Napier 53 ,463 
Tukituki 55 ,858 
Wairarapa 52,275 
Rangifikei 51,859 
Palmerston North 52,854 
Otaki 56,736 
Mana 53 ,662 
Rimutaka 56,014 
Hutt South 52,951 
Ohariu-Belmont 54,226 
Wellington Central 54,268 
Rongotai 53,093 
Nelson 56,038 
West Coast-Tasman 51,704 
Kaikoura 52,820 
W aimakariri 56,636 
Ilam 56,999 
Wigram 56,926 
Christchurch Central 56,350 
Christchurch East 56,306 
Banks Peninsula 56,892 
Rakaia 54,680 
Aoraki 52,175 
Otago 52,491 
Dunedin North 51 ,740 
Dunedin South 53 ,132 
Clutha-Southland 51 ,905 
Invercargill 51 ,672 
The average population of a General Electoral District (both North and South Islands) 
is 54,311 . The Maori Electoral Districts is 53 ,078. 
Maori Electorate Average 
General Electorate Average 
53 ,078 
54,311 
If these two numbers are compared, there is little over 1 OOO voters between them. 
While this is not exact, apportionment does not require "mathematical exactness", 108 
just likeness. The largest variety between electoral districts is between Invercargill 
and Ilam and the difference is over 5000 voters. Apportionment in New Zealand, and 
the purpose of the five percent rule, means that a vote for an electoral district 
candidate cast in Dunedin North should count the same as a vote cast in Te Tai Tonga. 
This is because the number of voter in Dunedin North is approximately the same as 
the voters in Te Tai Tonga. The representatives elected for both districts represent the 
same amount of people. For apportionment purposes, this is the only relevant factor. 
Apportionment is about the number of people in the constituency, not the amount of 
people who vote. The constituencies are of relative sizes, so the voters participation is 
equal. 
Comparatively the averages between the Maori and non-Maori districts are nominal. 
Apportionment is equality of members in a voting district and there is roughly the 
same amount of members in Maori districts as non-Maori districts. Accordingly, this 
means the Maori electoral districts do not contravene the electoral theory definition of 
' one person, one vote' apportionment rule. 
108 Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) p.577 
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8. One person, one vote - Democratic Theory 
As well as having a specific meaning in democratic processes, 'one person, one vote' 
has another, separate and distinct meaning when discussing democratic theory. 'One 
person, one vote' can also be defined as political equality 109 and universal suffrage. 11 0 
As stated earlier, political equality is one of the fundamental rules of democracy, and 
fits into the democratic framework as follows: 
1st Tier 
Fundamental 
Rules 
Political Equality Majority Rule 
This theory is statutorily embedded in section 12 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 
Section 12 states that: 
"Every New Zealand citizen who is of or over the age of 18 years-
(a) Has the right to vote in genuine periodic elections of Members of the 
House of Representatives, which elections shall be by equal suffrage and 
by secret ballot;" 
In the Bill of Rights the key phrase regarding the 'one person, one vote' rule is equal 
suffrage. This section is derived from Article 25 of the United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: 
" ... to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the electors." 111 
109 Phillips, (1995), p. 27 
11 0 Guinier, ( 1994), p.123 
111 In 1978 New Zealand ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New Zealand 
reserved articles l 0(2)(b ); 10(3); 14(6); 20; 22). In 1989 New Zealand ratified the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 1990 New Zealand ratified the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The full text of the 
Covenants are available at www.un.org 
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The terms universal and equal are also addressed by the United Nations in article S(c) 
of the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and Article 7 of the Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women. 112 These articles affirmed rights of equality before the law for 
everyone, without discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin. 
The question for debate surrounding the definition of universal and equal suffrage is 
axiomatically not about universal suffrage but about what equal suffrage means. 
Universal suffrage was introduced into New Zealand in 1896 113 and means that every 
person over the age of eighteen years is entitled to participate in electoral processes. 114 
However the definition of equality is one of the most contested elements of modem 
philosophy, Dworkin stated that "People who praise it or disparage it disagree about 
what they are praising or disparaging". 115 
From the debate regarding equality emerge two polar positions on the definition. On 
one side is the liberal tradition that argues that the law (including electoral law) 
should be blind to race and ethnicity. That having fair processes and procedures and 
treating like cases alike are the key aspects of equality. 116 Regarding electoral laws, 
11 2 The full text of the United Nations International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women is also 
available at www.un.org 
113 See Chapter 4 of this paper on the History of the Maori seats 
114 This is with the exception of people detained in hospitals under the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992; people being detained for life, preventive detention , or a 3 year 
term in prison; and people who have been convicted of an electoral corrupt practice as per section 80 of 
the Electoral Act 1993. 
11 5 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: the Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, (2000) 
116 The proposition of"fonnal" equality was originally promoted by Aristotle see both "Nicomachaen 
Ethics" and "Politics", The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume 2, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press ( 1984) 
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• 
commentary m favour of procedural equality argue that specialised jurisdictions 
bestow special and distinct rights, instead of concentrating on individual rights. 11 7 
The other competing theory is that equality is about substantive equality. That 
processes should enable equal outcomes, or near to it, for all affected. Applying 
substantive equality to electoral laws means that the mechanisms for participating do 
not have to be procedurally equal but have to ensure equity in the outcomes. This 
means that political equality needs all votes to have a substantively equitable 
outcome.
11 8 
For the purposes of the substantive theory, the methodology does not 
matter as long as the outcome is equitable. As seen earlier, democracy can take many 
different and distinct forms, however as long as the outcomes enable majority rule and 
political equality and the mechanisms are in accordance with the principles, it does 
not matter which mechanisms are used. 
Political equality as equal opportunity to participate 
Theorists, who support the traditional liberal assertion that the public sphere should be 
blind of ethnicity, generally assert that procedural equality is the key factor in political 
equality. This brand of commentators emphasise individual rights and assert that 
political and legal systems should be neutral on matters of ethnicity. 1 19 The trend has 
focussed on the universality of individual human rights, not on group rights. 
Individuals are responsible for maintaining and protecting their own ethnicity and 
values, while cultural membership is protected by freedom of association. 120 Theorists 
11 7 David Jonathan Weiner, Race lines: The Creation and Development of Maori Seats in New 
Zealand 's Parliament and African-American Maj ority-Minority Districts in the United States House of 
Representatives, A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Literature in Political Science, the University of Auckland, ( 1998), p. 19 
11 8 M ulgan, ( 1989), p. 82 
11 9 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, MacMillan Education Ltd: London, (1 992), pp. 18-3 1 
12° Kymlicka, p. I 07 
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of this kind believe that the free market will ultimately provide the best 
representation. 121 
In this category, political equality has been described as being the same treatment of 
everyone equally and without distinction. 122 The key element to understanding this 
perspective is the use of 'without distinction ', meaning that equality means treating 
everyone the same. However, always treating individuals the same does not enable 
equality because groups are not positioned equally in society. Not distinguishing 
between individuals denies the modem reality of having various separate cultures 
within the same state. 123 Accordingly, treating everyone as if they were the same is, 
quite simply, to ignore real and practical differences. 
Dahl has described political equality as the equal and effective opportunity to vote. 124 
However, just because everyone has the right to vote does not mean that everyone is 
represented. Voting equality is about the ability to "influence", 125 not just about the 
opportunity to participate and voters should have equal opportunity to vote for a 
winning candidate.126 If an individual has the opportunity to participate but has no 
chance to affect the outcomes, then this is not really participating. The Royal 
Commission stated that voter participation requires voters to be able to use their votes 
to choose both their representative and the Government. The Commission used the 
example of ' safe seats ' under the First Past the Post system as an example of non-
participation. The Commission stated that the margin between candidates was so large 
that it made individual votes in those constituencies virtually irrelevant. 127 
12 1 For a description of market liberal theory (and public choice theory) see Richard Mulgan, Politics in 
New Zealand, Auckland University Press: Auckland, (2"d ed. 1997), pp.8-9, 13-14, 18 and Andre Reeve 
and Alan Ware, Electoral Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Introduction, (1992) 
122 Mulgan, (1989), pp. 19, 35-36 
123 Paul Spooney, "Citizenship in a post-nation state", A Journal f or Radical Perspectives on Culture, 
Spring 1997; p.35 :1-19 
124 Robert Dahl Democracy, liberty and Equality (Norwegian University Press, Denmark, 1986), p. 
195 
125 See Guinier, ( 1994), p.90 for a definition of influence 
126 Guinier, (1994), p.122 
127 Royal Commission, pp. 22-23 
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Accordingly, under FPP, even though voters had the opportunity to participate, they 
did not have the ability to affect the outcome and hence were not truly participating in 
the election of representatives and Government. 
Rawls states that equality means political equality of opportunity, or the rights of 
participation in the political process. 128 This is similar to Dahl ' s argument, however 
an interpretation of Rawls ' difference theory could be extended to apply to political 
equality as well as social and economic situations.
129 Rawls states that positive 
discrimination, inequality in favour of a disadvantaged group, is acceptable if it works 
to the maximum benefit of the disadvantaged. 130 Democratic theorists 
131 have said 
Rawls ' difference theory can be extended to include electoral law. That positive 
discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups is applicable to representation. 
Accordingly special seats or other mechanisms are agreeable to the difference theory. 
Substantive Equality 
Theorists, who support the assertion that the public sphere cannot be blind of ethnicity 
because this denies the modem reality of co-existing separate cultures, 
132 generally 
assert that substantive equality is the key factor in political equality. In electoral law, 
substantive equality is the amount of votes received should be proportionate to the 
f · d 133 amount o power receive to govern. 
The major argument in favour of substantive equality is that institutions should not be 
concerned with procedural fairness but with effectual fairness. Substantive equality 
can be achieved either through proportional electoral systems that give each 
128 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, (1971 ) 
129 Joshua Cohen, ' Democratic Equality' in Ethics 99 ( 1989) 
130 Rawls, (1971 ), p. 20 
13 1 Cohen, (1989), p.729 and Phillips, (1994), p. 12 
132 Paul Spooney, "Citizenship in a post-nation state", A Journal for Radical Perspectives on Culture, 
Spring 1997; p.35 :1-19 
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subculture a share of the seats as proportional to its vote; 
134 internal party pre-election 
processes (for instance gender quotas in political parties); 
135 through specific 'identity 
representation' constituencies or reserved seats; 
136 or through consociational 
arrangements that attempt to fetter and limit political power by establishing grand 
coalitions. 137 
The Maori seats are a version of identity representation and so the examination of 
political equality, with regard to substantive equality, will be with regard to identity 
representation. Identity re~resentation is representation on a non-geographical basis, 
such as gender or ethnicity.138 
Kymlicka states that there are some groups of individuals that are "unfairly 
disadvantaged" 139 in contesting political representation and if this unfairness is not 
addressed it can lead to "serious injustices".
140 Accordingly, traditional liberal 
principles need to be supplemented by minority rights and equality needs to include 
justice for minorities, particularly indigenous peoples.
141 Kymlicka states that existing 
constitutional frameworks are manifestly inadequate and inequitable and, importantly 
for the context of this debate, that electoral institutions that fail to represent the 
population are undemocratic. Kymlicka proposes that accommodating differences and 
133 "Proportionality of PR Formulas" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral laws and their 
Political Consequences, Agathon Press: New York, (2"d ed. 1994) 
134 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (New Haven, CT, 1984) 
135 For debate and examples of party electoral quotas see both Karen Bird, "The Political 
Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A framework for 
Comparative Research", Working Paper presented for the Academy of Migration Studies in Denmark, 
Aalborg, (11 November 2003) and data from lDEA Global databases of Quotas for Women 
www.idea.int/guota 
136 Kym licka, (1995), pp. 133-134 
137 Robert Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998) p. 192 
138 The concept of ' identity representation ' is expanded in Chapter 8, when the paper discusses the 
rationales for geographical representation 
139 Kymlicka, (1995), p. I 09 
14° Kymlicka, ( 1995), p. I 09 
141 Kymlicka, (1995), p. 5 
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promoting group rights is true equality. 142 This can be accomplished through either 
self-government rights (for instance First Nation reservations in Canada); 143 
multicultural rights (for example under British law Sikhs are exempt from wearing 
motorcycle helmets so they can wear turbans as prescribed by their religion); 144 or 
special representation rights (for instance the Maori seats). 145 
The core rationales for having representation of minority groups is that not having 
representation of minorities delegitimises the political institution. 146 That having no 
accommodation of minorities, in particular indigenous minorities, can lead to the 
"demise of democracy and/or the escalation of ethnic conflict". 147 Lijphart has argued 
that multicultural systems that exclude minority representation are undemocratic in 
nature because of they fail to represent the population and systems need to incorporate 
power-sharing models. 148 
Guinier supports this argument and contends that systems that exclude (through 
electoral systems that are purely majoritarian) minorities do not have "genuine 
democracy".149 Guinier argues that political equality cannot mean that power is held 
exclusively; that in the presence of racial differences, electoral systems that do not 
provide for identity representation lose legitimacy. 150 
142 Kymlicka, (1995), p. 108 
143 Lower Mainland Treaty Advisory Committee, Democracy and First Nation Self-Government: 
Considering Rights of Representation f or Non-Member Residents in First Nation Jurisdictions, 
A Background Discussion Paper to LMTAC First Principle #27, Bumaby, B.C., Canada, (March 2003) 
144 Ramesh Thakur, "In Defence of Multiculturalism", in Stuart W Grief (ed.), immigration and 
National identity: One People, Twp Peoples, Many Peoples?, Dunmore Press: Palmerston North, 
(1995), p.257 
145 Kymlicka, (1995), pp. 26-33 
146 Weiner, ( 1998), p. 16 
147 Bernard Grofman, and Robert Stockwell, " Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic 
Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy", Conference Paper at the University of Messina Conference 
on The Political Economy of institutional Development, 14 -17 September 2000, p. 4 
148 Lijphart argues that consociational models are a better form of democracy than majoritarian 
systems, Lijphart, (1984), pp.22-23 
149 Guinier, ( 1994), p.6 
150 Guinier, (1994), p.121 
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Grofman states that conflict in societies stem from either national identity or 
competition for resources and that both of these issues can be mitigated by political 
representation of groups and power sharing. 151 Further, those institutional 
arrangements that ensure minority representation help facilitate political stability. 152 
As seen, political equality can either mean that the procedures for everyone are the 
same or that the outcomes for everyone are the same. New Zealand, due to 
international and domestic legal developments like the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has a system that many 
have classed as based on individual rights. 153 However, for the purposes of electoral 
law, a close examination of New Zealand's system does not necessarily support this 
view. Since the introduction of MMP, New Zealand has had a system that is focused 
on ensuring that the outcomes of elections are proportionately representative of the 
voters. Proportional systems, like MMP, are designed to ensure fair and effective 
representation 154 that is focussed towards reflecting the amount of votes with the 
corresponding amount of power in governing. 155 The Royal Commission stated that 
moving to a proportional system would enhance voter participation and effective 
representation, 156 accordingly helping to ensure fairer and more effective 
representation. Kymlicka and Guinier both argue that proportional systems are a fairer 
electoral model for minorities. 157 At its heart, proportional representation is about 
ensuring that as many facets of society as possible are represented. The reason for 
151 Grofman, (2000), p. 3 
152 Bernard Grofman, "Arend Lijphart and the New Institutionalism" in Markus M. L. Crepaz, Thomas 
Koelble, and David Wilsford, Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart, University 
of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, pp. 43-74 
153 Palmer, (2004), p. 347 
154 Guinier, (1994), p. 92 
155 Lijphart succinctly defines this objective of proportionality in Arend Lijphart, "Proportionality of 
PR Formulas" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and their Political 
Consequences, Agathon Press: New York, (2 11d ed. 1994) 
156 Royal Commission, pp.45-64 
157 Kymlicka, (1995), pp. 133-134 and Guinier, Lani "The Representation of Minority Interests: The 
Question of Single-Member Districts" 14 Cardozo Law Review I 153 (April 1993) 
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New Zealand's move to a proportional system has been described as the result of 
support for equality and fairness for voters. 158 
Defining what the 'one person, one vote' rule means in relation to political equality is 
difficult, namely because of the debate spanning the better part of a decade on the 
meaning of equality. However, New Zealand' s move to a proportional electoral 
system has clearly indicated a constitutional bias towards equality meaning equitable 
outcomes. That bias can be extended to define political equality, in the New Zealand 
context, as being fair outcomes. 
New Zealand' s use of a semi-proportional system, 137 years of established identity 
representation, 159 its particular interpretation of democracy and its constitutional 
principles and law, 160 steers towards categorising New Zealand' s definition of 
political equality as outcomes based. Accordingly, the New Zealand system, as a 
whole, is focussed towards outcomes that are representationally fair. 
Having established that New Zealand constitutional law favours equitable outcomes, 
the question remains whether Maori are entitled to special recognition and whether 
the Maori seats actually provide political equality. 
Putting aside the liberal arguments of blindness on ethnicity, the basis for Maori status 
in New Zealand (or indeed whether there is any such status) differs depending on the 
commentator. However, there are three distinct, and at times overlapping, camps. 
There is the 'Treaty of Waitangi ' category; the 'Maori as an indigenous people' 
category; and the 'Maori as an underprivileged subculture ' category. 
The analysis that Maori have a special status because of the protections afforded them 
under the Treaty of Waitangi can be divided into two parts, first that the Treaty 
158 Atkinson, (2003), p. 201 
159 In the form of the Maori seats 
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established a partnership between Maori and the Crown and second that the seats are 
protected by Article III of the Treaty. 161 The argument that Maori have special status 
because of their partnership with the Crown has been laid out by the Courts over a 
number of cases describing the principles of the Treaty. 162 The Courts' have described 
the Crown/Maori relationship as "akin to a partnership", 163 although not as equals 164 
but as partners owing each other duties of reasonable conduct and good faith. 165 
According to these principles, Maori have a bilateral partnership under the Treaty, 
that has led to the development of bicultural policies, that of the recognition of two 
"cultures and peoples of particular importance". 166 
The second argument under this category is that Maori representation in Parliament is 
guaranteed by Article III of the Treaty. Article III states that Maori are British 
citizens, and are afforded all the rights and responsibilities thereof. An argument has 
been made that Article III confers an obligation on the New Zealand Parliament to 
power-share with Maori 167 and that it would therefore be appropriate to have an equal 
numerical divide between Maori and non-Maori in the House of Representatives. 168 
The argument asserting that Maori rights stem from a partnership under the Treaty is a 
lot stronger than the Article III argument and has been developed and tested by the 
Courts. Although the Article III argument is an interesting perspective on the Treaty, 
it needs further development and analysis to build a more substantive case. 
160 As expressed by Trapski, (1998), p. 9 
161 Simon Reeves, To Honour the Treaty, (2"d ed. Earth Restoration Ltd, Auckland, 1996) 
162 For a summary of the Courts interpretations of the principles of the Treaty see Te Puni Kokiri , He 
Tirohanga o Kawa kite Tiriti o Waitangi: A guide to the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as 
expressed by the Courts and Waitangi Tribua/, Te Puni Kokiri: Wellington (2001), pp. 74-106 
163 Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu v Attorney General [1993) 2 NZLR 30 I at 304, referred to as the 
Sealords case 
164 New Zealand Miiori Council v Attorney General [1989) 2 NZLR (CA) 142 at 152 
165 Te Puni Kokiri, (2001) quoting Lord Cooke, "Introduction", New Zealand Universities Law Review, 
(1990), p.6 
166 Richard Mulgan, "Multiculturalism: A New Zealand Perspective" in Chandran Kukathas ed., 
Multicultural Citizens: The philosophy and Politics of Identity, The Centre for Independent Studies 
Ltd: New South Wales, (1993) 
167 Reeves, ( 1996), pp.3-4, 10 
168 Reeves, ( 1996), pp. 83-84 
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The second analysis asserting the significant status of Maori is that Maori have special 
status as a group in New Zealand because they indigenous; 169 that Maori have certain 
status in the recognition that they were the first inhabitants and are tangata whenua. 170 
This is because indigenous or aboriginal rights applied automatically upon 
colonisation under British customary law. 171 This argument also stems from Maori 
being a sovereign nation before colonisation 172 and the rights of self-determination 173 
that entails. This recognition of Maori as indigenous people is the basis for New 
Zealand's biculturalism. 174 
The last category is that Maori are an underprivileged subculture, and as such, need a 
boost to elevate them to become equal with the rest of society. This is sometimes 
referred to as 'affirmative action' or compensatory policies. According to this theory, 
in order for a group to be entitled to rights, it needs to be shown that something 
occurred, and if that something had not occurred, then the group would be on equal 
footing with the rest of society. 175 Commentators have suggested that recent 
Government policies, like 'Closing the gaps' 176 and 'Reducing inequalities' , support 
this version of describing the status of Maori and attempts to elevate Maori to the 
same position as the rest of New Zealand. 177 This category states that Maori have 
rights because of their greater numbers; their greater suffering; and their having no 
169 Paul McHugh, 'An overview of the era of aboriginal self-determination: from rights-recognition to 
rights-integration and - management' in Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law, Otago University 
Press, forthcoming 
name of book, soon to be published 
170 Royal Commission, (1986), p. 6 
171 Professor Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, (1987) 66 Can Bar Re. 272 at 737 
172 Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, (Allen and Unwin Port Nicholson Press, Wellington. 1987) 
173 Ann Sullivan, 'Effecting Change through Electoral Politics: cultural identity and the Maori 
franchise' Journal of the Polynesian Society, vol. 112, no. 3 (Sept. 2003), p.15 
174 Joe Williams, 'Legal, Technical and Mechanical Issues' in Treaty of Waitangi issues- the last 
decade and the next century, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, (April 1997), pp.29-30 
175 H. L. A. Hart, 'Are there any natural rights? ', Philosophical Review, 6 (1995) 
176 Te Puni Kokiri , Progress Towards Closing Social and Economic Gaps between Maori and non-
Miiori, (1998) focussed on developing policies that tried to equalise Maori and non-Maori in terms of 
social and economic status. 
177 McHugh, (forthcoming) 
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alternate homeland. 
178 
However this theory ignores the position of Maori as the 
indigenous people and as Treaty partners, as it is based on socioeconomic needs, not 
on Maori rights as Maori. 179 The affirmative action programmes categorise Maori as a 
minority, when Maori have special rights as indigenous people and as tangata 
whenua.
180 
While the argument for 'Maori as underprivileged subculture ' is based on 
legitimate attempts to equalise the socio-economic position of Maori with the rest of 
New Zealand, 181 it ignores the differences and unique status of Maori. Maori are not a 
'sub-culture' of the New Zealand dominant culture but are an entirely different culture 
with rights and responsibilities as such. 182 
The most preferred option for categorising Maori as a group with a special status is an 
amalgamation of Maori as an indigenous people and Maori as Treaty partners. Maori 
are the indigenous people who had separate sovereignty over New Zealand, however 
via the Treaty, Maori ceded that sovereignty, became British citizens, while at the 
same time keeping their legal status as an indigenous people. Accordingly, Maori 
rights as a group are not purely as indigenous people and neither are they as Treaty 
partners. Maori rights are tied to both the Treaty and their indigeneity. 
Actually provide equality? 
Having established that New Zealand constitution prefers a system that is outcomes 
based and Maori have a unique status, it now needs to be determined whether or not 
the Maori seats are needed to provide for political equality for Maori. This paper 
argues that political equality means substantially equal outcomes, so in order to meet 
178 Andrew Sharp, ' Why be bicultural ', in Margaret Wilson and Anna Yeatman eds., Justice and 
identity : Antipodean Practices, Bridget Williams Books : Wellington, (1995) 
179 Hekia Parata, 'The Treaty of Waitangi as a policy framework' in Treaty of Waitangi issues- the last 
decade and the next century, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, (April 1997), pp. 21-22 
180 Royal Commission, ( 1986), p. 6 
181 Parata, ( 1997), p. 22 
182 Matahaere-Atariki , Donna C., Human Rights and the Treaty: The Ngai Tahu Experience, Human 
Rights and the Treaty Symposium, (31 July 2003), pp. 3-4 
this requirement the Maori seats must demonstrate that they enable equitable 
representation for Maori. 
There are eighteen Members of Parliament who identify as being Maori, these are: 183 
Georgina Beyer Labour Wairarapa 
Bill Gudgeon NZFirst List 
Dave Hereora Labour List 
Parekura Horomia Labour lkaroa-Rawhiti 
Nanaia Mahuta Labour Tainui 
Moana Mackey Labour List 
Ron Mark NZFirst List 
Mahara Okeroa Labour Te Tai Tonga 
Pita Paraone NZFirst List 
Edwin Perry NZFirst List 
Jim Peters NZFirst List 
Winston Peters NZFirst Tauranga 
Mita Ririnui Labour Waiariki 
Dover Samuals Labour Te Tai Tokerau 
John Tamihere Labour Tamaki Makaurau 
Georgina Te Heuheu National List 
Metiria Turei Greens List 
Tariana Turia Maori Party Te Tai Hauauru 
Maori make up approximately 15.2% of the population. 184 Maori Members of 
Parliament make up 15% of the House, this is pretty much the same. If the Maori 
electoral districts were removed from the equation, Maori Members would make up 
9.2% of the House. A considerably lower portion when reconciled against the Maori 
population. If the Maori seats were completely abolished, under the current figures , 
there would be a lack of representatives proportional to the Maori population. It is 
concerning that there are only two elected Maori Members in general electoral 
183 This is sourced from John Wilson, "The Origins of the Maori Seats", Parliamentary Library, 
Wellington, (2003) available at www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz , but excludes Jill Pettis, as the Member 
does not consider herself a 'Maori representative ' and accordingly does not attend the Labour Party 
Maori Caucus, and Donna Awatere-Huata on the basis of her pending litigation with the ACT Party for 
her removal from the Party and consequentially the House. 
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districts. If the seats were abolished, Maori representation would essentially rely on 
political party lists. This may not ensure adequate representation proportional to the 
population. Also, constituency Members have been perceived to be better or of more 
value than List Members. List Members have been "referred to as ' second-class' by 
the media, parliamentary colleagues and the public alike".185 List Members' role had 
been described as the "ideal job- a people's representative without people to 
represent." .186 Whether these criticisms are valid, the public seems to respect 
electorate Members more than List Members. If Maori did not have Maori electorate 
Members, then they would have no direct representation. Maori would not have a 
mandated Member to directly lobby on their behalf. 
This potential problem is illustrated by Georgina Beyer' s stance over the Foreshore 
and Seabed legislation. Beyer had concerns supporting the proposed legislation 187 but 
after a clear directive from her electorate, she changed her position.188 Beyer is a 
Maori Member but elected by a general district. Beyer did not want to vote for a Bill 
when the policy "violates the rule oflaw" 189 and was "unfair because it is inconsistent 
in its treatment of Maori groups" .190 However, after a series of consultation meetings 
with her constituency, Beyer supported the Bill. Demonstrating the conflict between 
the Burkian philosophy of representation and the role as a representative to act as 
instructed by voters. 
Percent of Members + or - Maori population 
(15.2%) 
I Maori Members 15% -0.2% 
184 Statistics New Zealand estimates that the Maori population at 30 June 2003 was 609,700 and that 
the total New Zealand population was 4,009,200, see www.stats.govt.nz 
185 Leigh J Ward, 'Second-Class MPs? New Zealand 's Adaptation to Mixed-Member Parliamentary 
Representation", Political Science, 49: 125-152 at 127 
186 James Allen, 'MMP still fails to perform ', The National Business Review, (6 November 2003) 
187 Chen, Palmer and Partners, Wellington Watch, Issue 2004/ 16, (2004) 
188 Chen, Palmer and Partners, Wellington Watch Issue 2004/12, (2004) 
189 Waitangi Tribunal Report, WAI I 071 Report on the Crown 's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, 
Legislation Direct, (2004), p. 123 
190 Waitangi Tribunal Report, WAI 1071 Report on the Crown 's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, 
Legislation Direct, (2004), 123 
59 
Maori electorate Members 5.8% -9.4% 
Maori list Members 8.3% -6.9% 
Maori general electorate 1.6% -13.6% 
Members 
Total non Maori electorate 9.9% -5.3% 
Maori Members 
The Royal Commission's reassurance that MMP would adequately cater for Maori 
and there would be no need for separate Maori seats 191 but the above analysis has 
shown that this has not been proved to be the case. But for the Maori seats, Maori 
would be proportionally underrepresented in the House. At this time, the Maori seats 
are still needed to retain an adequate level of political equality. 
The major argument that the Maori seats should not be abolished is that Maori will 
decide themselves, via the Maori Electoral Option, when the seats are no longer 
necessitated. 192 The Maori Electoral Option has a built in benefit of not only enabling 
to chose whether they want identity representation but also it is a five yearly litmus 
test of the Maori desire to maintain or abolish separate Maori representation. It is 
interesting that since the introduction of the MMP system and the MEO, the number 
of Maori opting for the Maori roll has steadily been rising, as evidence by the rising 
number of seats. The inaugural Maori Electoral Option produced five Maori seats. 
The second Maori Electoral Option produced six Maori seats. The last Maori 
Electoral Option in 2001 produced another seat, taking the total to seven. If this trend 
continues, then the 2006 Option will see another seat added, bringing the total to 
eight. Hypothetically, if there was an Electoral Option tomorrow and all Maori chose 
to go onto the Maori rolled then there would be 11 Maori seats. 
Potential Maori Electoral Districts 
609,700 + 54,308 = 11.2 
19 1 Royal Commission, (1986), p. 102 
192 Report of the MMP Review Committee, Inquiry into the Review of MMP,2001 , Order of the House 
of Representatives, Wellington, p.20 
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9. Identity representation 
Geography is not the only way to divide the populous into groupings. De Grazia states 
that the population can be divided into constituencies on the basis of territorial 
surveys; governmental boundaries (for example towns); official bodies; functional 
divisions of the population; or free population. 193 Further, he states that territorial 
surveys are the most artificial constructs of these divisions. Guinier advocates that 
constituencies should be psychological, cultural and/or political. 194 Mulgan canvasses 
the possibilities that constituencies could be based on occupational groups, gender; 
age; or ethnicity. 195 There also continues to be modem advocates for the Athenian 
lottery system. 196 
Incorporating minority views, especially the views of indigenous peoples, is not 
exclusive to New Zealand. Many different countries incorporate a form of identity 
representation, 197 including having reserved seats for minorities. Countries that have 
reserved seats include: Croatia (where seats are reserved for Hungarian, Italian, 
Czech, Slovak, Ruthenium, Ukrainian, German and Austrian minorities); Singapore 
(for Malay, Indian and other ethnic communities); Slovenia (for Hungarians and 
Italians); Jordan (for Christians and Circassians); Pakistan (for non-Muslim 
minorities); Western Samoa (for non-indigenous minorities); Colombia (for Black 
communities and indigenous peoples); and the Palestinian Authority (for Christians 
and Samaritans). 198 
193 De Grazia, (1963), p. 20 
194 Guinier, (1994), p. 140 
195 Mulgan, ( 1989), p. 82 
196 The theory of demachy advocates that randomly selected groups to work on particular issues is a 
truer form of democracy than representative democracy, see John Burnheim, ls Democracy Possible? 
The Alternative to Electoral Politics, London: Polity Press, (1985) 
197 Robert Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998) p. 192 categorises minority 
representation into two categories, electoral arrangements and consociational arrangements. 
198 Bird, Aalborg University, (2003), pp. 3, 25 
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The history and implementation of the franchise, and its connection to land, explains 
New Zealand' s fixation on geographic representation. Under section 35 of the 
Electoral Act 1993, New Zealand is divided into general electoral districts. These 
electoral districts are primarily based on communities of interest, facilities of 
communications and topographical features. However, the focus on geographical 
representation was inherited from the English Westminster system, 199 which evolved 
from feudalism. 200 Originally democracy was focussed in representation of the land 
and not of people and "it was the land and not men which should be represented".20 1 
Importation of this into New Zealand can be seen in the criteria for voting in New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852, where any male was eligible to register to vote if they 
owned land or leased of property valued above £10.202 New Zealand directly imported 
a system based on land holdings as the cornerstone of citizenship. One of the rationale 
for the universal male Maori franchise, in the Maori Representation Act 1867, was it 
was thought unfair that although Maori had large land holdings they were ineligible to 
vote because the land was communally owned. 203 
This sense of representation of land and not people was further compounded by the 
English nature of representation. Famously, Edmund Burke said that constituent 
representation are secondary to the needs of the country as a whole and "Parliament is 
a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole".
204 
Members were in Parliament on behalf of the nation as a whole, not of the people they 
were elected by. 
11 November, 2003 
199 Atkinson, p. 53 
200 Enid Lakeman and James Douglas Lambert, How Democracies Vote: a study of majority and 
proportional electoral systems, London : Faber, (1970) 
20 1 Lani Guinier quoting A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, Longmans, Green and Co: London, 
(2nd electoral districts. 1926), p. 164 
202 Royal Commission, "The Electoral Law of New Zealand" Appendix A 
203 Sorenson, (1986), pp. 18-21 
204 Edmund Burke, "In his Speech to the Electors of Bristol fo llowing hi s election as local MP (3 rd 
November 1774" in George Otto Trevelyan George the Third and Charles Fox London: Longmans, 
Green, ( 1912), vol.2, p. 302 
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New Zealand transitioned from voting eligibility being determined on economic land 
status to being determined by citizenship during the 1880s and 1890s. The value 
placed on association with property qualifications is illustrated by the fact that both 
Maori and women were franchised before the property qualifications were abolished 
in 1896.205 However the idea that franchise was tied to property was not altogether 
dismissed, when property qualifications were abolished a quota system, to ensure that 
people living in rural areas were represented, was established.206 
New Zealand only turned to "one person, one vote' after the abolishment of the rural 
quota in 1945207 and even then the Representation Commission (responsible for 
setting electoral boundaries) was to take into account "consideration of community of 
interests" . 208 The term "communities of interest" has been carried over in the Electoral 
Act 1993, and is, along with geography, communication facilities and apportionment 
(within 5%), the basis for the Representation Commission deciding on electoral 
boundaries. 
The non-geographic constituencies need to be incorporated m the democratic 
framework by seeing if they breach any part of the framework: 
1st Level 
Political Equality Majority Rule 
Fundamental 
Rules 
2nd Level 
Participatory Accountable Representative Competitive 
Democratic 
Principles 
205 Atkinson, (2003), p. l 03 and B. Ritchie and H. G. Hoffman, 'The Electoral Law of New Zealand: A 
brief history ' in Royal Commission on the Electoral System, ( 1986), Appendix A- 65-66 
206 The ' country quota ' was introduced in the Representation Act 1887, see Ritchie, (1986), A-42 
207 Atkinson, (2003 ), pp. 156-160 . . . 
208 Appendices to the Journal ofthe House of Representatives, 1946, H.46, p.3 quoted m R1tch1e, 
(1986), A-66 
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- inclusive of all - periodic - elected - electoral 
adults elections representatives system 
- protection of - separation of - free, open and - party and 
civil and political powers fair elections candidacy 
3rd Level rights - access to diversity 
Operations - education official - free press 
-consultation on information - free association 
critical issues - non-elected 
-apportionment officials 
accountable to 
elected officials 
Identity representation is not undemocratic.209 Non-geographic constituencies allow 
for political equality and majority rule. Non-geographic constituencies are inclusive of 
all the identified principles of democracy; they can ensure participation, 
accountability, representativeness and competitiveness. All of the mechanics of 
democracy can be done under non-geographic constituencies. Identity representation 
is primarily concerned with ensuring participation and representation. Assessment 
against these two principles show that non-geographic constituencies can be inclusive 
of all adults; protect civil and political rights; enable education and consultation on 
important issues; and also do not prohibit apportionment. Non-geographic 
constituencies also allow for elected representatives and for open, free and fair 
elections. Against this assessment, non-geographic constituencies are democratic. 
In Chapter 8 it was established that Maori status in New Zealand stems both from 
rights under the Treaty210 and from rights as the indigenous people.2 11 For the 
purposes of identity representation this is an important distinction. Aside from 
liberalism, one of the strongest arguments against identity representation is deciding 
which groups are entitled to representation and that allowing one group to be 
represented would ' open the floodgates ' to a multitude of groups clambering for 
209 Kymlicka, (1995), p. 133 and Mulgan, (1989), p. 82 
2 1° For a explanation of Maori rights stemming from the principles of the Treaty see Te Puni Kokiri, He 
Tirohanga 8 Kawa kit e Tiriti o Waitangi: A guide to the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi as 
expressed by the Courts and Waitangi Tribunal, Te Puni Kokiri : Wellington (200 I) 
2 11 Paul McHugh, ' An overview of the era of aboriginal self-determination : from rights-recognition to 
rights-integration and - management' in Aboriginal Societies and the Common l aw, Otago University 
Press, forthcoming 
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presentation. However in the New Zealand context, due to the special constitutional 
status of Maori, this criticism is difficult to make. Maori and Maori alone are the only 
grouping that is indigenous to New Zealand and they are also the only group to be 
constitutional partners with the Crown. On these grounds, differentiating Maori from 
other groups, for instance women or new immigrants, that may seek identity 
representation is simple because Maori have a unique and special status that is 
different from the position of any other group. 
The theory that constituencies must be based on geography is an historical 
convenience212 that has become unquestioned in Western democracies. However, it 
has been repeatedly contended that geographic constituencies are not fairly 
representative of minority groups213 and pure single member majority in multicultural 
societies are exclusionary and accordingly undemocratic. 2
14 Identity representation 
provides an alternative to geographic representation that is more inclusive of 
disadvantaged groups and 
• 216 d representative an more 
minorities.215 Identity representation 1s more 
encouragmg of participation217 than geographic 
constituencies. Identity representation also enables those currently excluded from 
politics to engage more directly in political debate and decisions.
218 For these reasons, 
it has been argued that non-geographic constituencies are more democratic than their 
geographic counterparts. 
2 12 Mulgan, (1989), p. 82 
2 13 Guinier, (1994), p. 123 
214 Lijphart, ( 1984), pp.22-23 
215 Phillips, (1995), pp. 12-13 , 35-48 
2 16 Guinier, ( 1994), pp.140-156 
2 17 Phillips, (1994), pp. 31-36 
2 18 Phillips, (1995), p. 167 
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10. Conclusion 
This paper has considered whether the existence and operation of the Maori electoral 
districts is consistent with a general theory of democracy and with the New Zealand 
experience of democracy. This paper has found that the existence of the Maori seats is 
consistent with the New Zealand experience and particular interpretation of 
democracy. Further that the seats are in accordance with New Zealand constitutional 
principles and law.2 19 
The paper built a framework to define democracy. The framework established three 
levels of democracy: Level One the fundamental rules of democracy; Level Two the 
principles of democracy; and Level Three the mechanisms for implementing the 
fundamental rules and the principles. The fundamental rules of democracy have been 
determined to be majority rule and political equality. The principles of democracy 
have been determined to be representation, accountability, participation and 
competition. There is no specific set of mechanisms needed in Level Three. All that 
is required is that the Level Three mechanisms operationalise the fundamental rules, 
in accordance with the principles, to enable democracy. The fundamental rules and 
the principles sit alongside each other, neither usurping the other. Political equality 
ensures that there is equity in representation; and majority rule ensures that the will of 
the people is carried out. The rules and principles mitigate each other to ensure fair 
and just democracy. Institutions must abide by the rules and principles to be 
democratic. 
The paper explored the history of the Maori seats and investigated their place in a 
democratic society. The paper considered the tension between the powerful, and 
culturally embedded concept New Zealanders appear to prize of 'one person, one 
2 19 Trapski , ( 1998), p. 9 
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vote' and democratic theory about identity representation and then examined whether 
the seats are undemocratic by testing them against the framework. 
'One person, one vote' has been defined to mean both that voters must be apportioned 
to each other and that voters must be politically equal. Analysis has shown that both 
Maori and general electoral districts are, for all practical purposes, well apportioned. 
Whether the seats breach political equality, was a more difficult question to answer, 
namely because of the debate spanning the better part of a decade on the meaning of 
equality. However, New Zealand' s move to a proportional electoral system has clearly 
indicated a constitutional bias towards equality meaning equitable outcomes. That 
bias can be extended to define political equality, in the New Zealand electoral context, 
as being fair outcomes. 
It has been demonstrated that the Maori seats provide equitable outcomes for Maori in 
the New Zealand House of Representatives. 
Identity representation has been analysed against the democratic framework. It has 
been determined that identity representation does not breach the fundamental rules or 
principles of democracy and that constituencies can be drawn in many different ways, 
including geography and ethnicity. In fact, there is a strong argument that identity 
representation is more democratic than geographic representation. The Maori seats, as 
a form of identity representation, are not undemocratic. 
The Royal Commission was not correct that MMP would provide adequate Maori 
proportionality in the House, and was therefore also not correct that asserting that the 
Maori seats would not be needed. Without the Maori seats, Maori would not have had 
proportional representation in the House since the inception of MMP in New Zealand. 
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Given the Maori seats are not undemocratic, and in fact enhance New Zealand 
democracy, and the seats do not interfere with other individuals democratic freedoms 
' 
then pragmatically they are a tolerable option at the present time. 
Due to chronic Maori disproportional representation during most of the twentieth 
century, it is vital that proportional Maori representation is ensured during the next 
century. Accordingly, the seats deserve more constitutional protection than they 
currently have. The seats are not entrenched, as other significant parts are, in under 
the Electoral Act 1993.
220 Only a simple majority of Parliament is required to abolish 
them. Given their high value to Maori,221 and the need to ensure proportional Maori 
representation, entrenching the seats should be considered. 
It is paradoxical that the electoral feature that New Zealand is internationally most 
renowned, recognised and praised for is so criticised internally.222 Countries, for 
instance Australia,223 are currently investigating ways to try and provide permanent 
representation for their indigenous groups. Often these countries point to New 
Zealand as the example of how to establish and run identity representation for an 
indigenous population in a democratic way.224 
220 Section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 contains reserved provisions relating to the term of 
Parliament, provisions relating to defining electoral districts and the electoral population, quota 
adjustment, method of voting and voting age. Being a reserved provision means the provision cannot 
be repealed or amended unless it is by at least 75% of the members. 
221 New Zealand Electoral Study, (2000), p. 35 
222 See Lijphart, (1994), Lijphart, (1984), Varennes, (1998), Guinier, (1994), Kymlicka, (1995), 
Grofman, ( 1994) 
223 Both Queensland and New South Wales have recently investigated the viability of having 
representation specifically for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders see Legislative Assembly of 
Queensland Legal , Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Hands on Parliament: A 
Parliamentary committee inquiry into Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ' participation in 
Queensland's democratic process, Report No. 42, (September 2003) and Parliament of New South 
Wales Standing Committee on Social Issues, Enhancing Aboriginal Political Representation: inquiry, 
into Dedicated Seats in the New South Wales Parliament, Report No. 18, (November 1998). 
224 Parliament of New South Wales Standing Committee on Social Issues, (1998), pp. 21-22 and 
Legislative Assembly of Queensland Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, 
(2003), pp. 53-54 
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The Maori electoral districts are not undemocratic. If anything the seats actually 
enhance New Zealand democracy. Statements about the democratic nature of 
institutions should be based on an understanding of what democracy is. Accordingly, 
criticisms of the seats need to be re-evaluated. 
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